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Abstract  
The two most significant factors that affect the deployment of Next Generation Access (NGA) 
networks are the cost of the investment and the expected demand for the new fibre-based 
services. The related literature is based on very simplified assumptions regarding cost and 
demand structures. 
In particular, the investment cost is assumed to be increasing and convex reflecting the fact 
that fibre deployment becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended to rural, less 
populated areas. In addition, the demand for the new fibre-based services is estimated by 
assuming that a certain level of NGA investment leads all consumers to equally increase their 
willingness to pay for such services. 
This article contributes to the emerging research on the investment in access infrastructures. 
In particular, the assumptions about cost and demand structures are modified in order to 
capture the access networks’ underlying morphology complexity and the consumers’ 
socioeconomic characteristics, respectively. Firstly, an empirical analysis is conducted for the 
100 major municipal departments from urban to rural in Greece. Their street network data are 
analyzed as the basis of the NGA installation combining GIS technology and Graph Theory 
techniques and hence the main cost-drivers are derived. Using regression analysis a real-data-
based cost function is obtained. Secondly, a novel model that takes into account 
socioeconomic characteristics affecting the impact of a certain level of NGA investment on 
consumers’ willingness to pay is developed. The Pareto consumer distribution is used to 
reflect the greater (lower) positive impact of NGA investments on the willingness to pay of 
the consumers who live in more (less) populated areas. 
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The comparison of the existing models with the ones developed in this paper shows that: (i) 
the cost function used in the existing models always underestimates the investment cost of the 
higher populated areas and overestimates the investment cost of the lower populated areas; (ii) 
the demand for the new fibre-based services is higher under the proposed than the existing 
approach; and (iii) the level of NGA investment chosen by the investor is always much higher 
under the proposed than the existing approach. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, the number of Internet users, as well as, the capacity they demand 
have increased dramatically. As a result, the increasing transmitted volume of data made the 
traditional access copper networks incapable of providing end-users with the demanded 
bandwidth. On the contrary, access networks based on optical fibre are the only future proof 
solution capable to handle the future demands (Shumate, 2008), since the transmission 
capabilities of fibre are theoretically unlimited providing high data rates, low loss and low 
distortion. Such fibre-based access networks are widely known as Next Generation Access 
(NGA) networks. According to European Commission “NGA networks mean wired access 
networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of 
delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) 
as compared to those provided over already existing copper networks. In most cases NGA 
networks are the result of an upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial access network” 
(EC, 2010a). 
However, not only technical reasons but also economic ones make the need for investments in 
NGA networks imperative. In particular, it is found that  investments in broadband 
infrastructure have an undisputable positive effect on economic growth and broadband 
diffusion (Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer and Woessmann, 2011; Katz, Vaterlaus, Zenhäusern 
and Suter, 2010; Reynolds, 2009). These results partially interpret why national governments 
rank among their top priorities the encouragement of investments in NGA networks. The US 
government’s National Broadband Plan (FCC, 2010) and the European Commission’s Digital 
Agenda for Europe (EC, 2010b) are examples of these perceived political priorities for the 
diffusion of broadband infrastructure access and services. According to EC (2010a): 
“The EU single market for electronic communications services, and in particular the 
development of very high-speed broadband services, is key to creating economic growth and 
achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. The fundamental role of telecommunications 
and broadband deployment in terms of EU investment, job creation and overall economic 
recovery was notably highlighted by the European Council in the conclusions of its March 
2009 meeting.” 
It can be thus concluded that very high-speed broadband services are widely accepted as 
strategically important not only because of their ability to accelerate the contribution of 
information and communications technology (ICT) to economic growth (Teppayayon and 
Bohlin, 2010), but also because network investments are potentially important targets of 
public investment during downturns as a way to increase demand and employment (Reynolds, 
2009). 
However, service providers are still reluctant to invest in NGA networks mainly due to the 
high investment cost and the ambiguity about the expected demand for the new fibre-based 
services. There are several theoretical economic approaches that aim to model the cost 
structure of investing in NGA networks, as well as, the impact of such investments on the 
future demand for the new fibre-based services. Most of these approaches assume that the 
investment cost is increasing and convex reflecting the fact that fibre deployment becomes 
marginally more expensive as it is extended to rural, less populated areas (Nitsche and 
Wiethaus, 2011; Foros, 2004). In addition, they also assume that the demand for the new 
fibre-based services is not affected by the relationship between the valuation that the 
consumers place to such services and their location (i.e. the population-affected type of the 
area they live in). Although these assumptions are useful for practical reasons; they fail to 
take into account the access networks’ underlying morphology complexity and the consumers’ 
socioeconomic characteristics, respectively.  
This paper contributes to the emerging research on the investment in NGA networks by 
modifying the existing cost and demand structure assumptions in order to capture the access 
networks’ underlying morphology complexity and the consumers’ socioeconomic 
characteristics, respectively. Firstly, an empirical cost analysis is conducted for the 100 major 
municipal departments from urban to rural in Greece. Their street network data are analyzed as 
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the basis of the NGA installation combining GIS technology and Graph Theory techniques and 
hence the main cost-drivers are derived. Using regression analysis a real-data-based cost 
function is obtained. Secondly, a novel model that takes into account socioeconomic 
characteristics affecting the impact of a certain level of NGA investment on consumers’ 
willingness to pay is developed. The Pareto consumer distribution is used to reflect the greater 
(lower) positive impact of NGA investments on the willingness to pay of the consumers who 
live in more (less) populated areas. 
The comparison of the existing models with the ones developed in this paper shows that: (i) 
the cost function used in the existing models always underestimates the investment cost of the 
higher populated areas and overestimates the investment cost of the lower populated areas; (ii) 
the demand for the new fibre-based services is higher under the proposed than the existing 
approach; and (iii) the level of NGA investment chosen by the investor is always much higher 
under the proposed than the existing approach. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the existing approach in terms of cost and 
demand functions is reviewed. Section 3 proposes a new approach to estimate the cost of 
deploying an NGA network based on real cost data from Greece and modifies the widely used 
demand model with network externalities in order to capture the fact that consumers who place 
a higher (lower) valuation to broadband subscription tend to live in higher (lower) populated 
areas. Section 4 compares the results of the two approaches in terms of the optimal investment 
level for the investor and the subsequent levels of subscribers, investment costs, revenues and 
profits. The last section summarizes the main results of this article and proposes the directions 
for future work. 
 
 
2. Existing approach  
This section provides the existing cost and demand functions that are widely used in the 
literature of NGA investments in order to estimate the investment level that maximizes the 
investor’s profits.  
 
2.1 Existing cost models 
Currently, most telecom operators are reluctant to significantly upgrade their 
telecommunication access network due to the high investment cost. Upgrade to NGA 
networks is generally perceived as the Fibre to the Curb (FTTC), Fibre to the Building (FTTB) 
and, of course, Fibre to the Home (FTTH) which is the ultimate and most future-proof access 
solution. To make any profound decisions on replacing some or all copper cable with optical 
fibre, a reasonably accurate cost model is needed, with enough detail on differences between 
deployments in different regions. 
The related literature on telecommunications investments (Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011; Foros, 
2004) is based on very simplified assumptions regarding the cost structure. The investor in the 
abovementioned approaches determines the extent of NGA deployment, R . The investment 
level is considered continuous and a larger R  reflects a larger geographic coverage within a 
given market area (e.g. fibre to the outskirts rather than to the city centre, or to less populated 
cities). The NGA deployment is assumed to require investments of the following quadratic 
form: 
 
2
2
φR
C(R)=  (1) 
 
 5 
where φ  is an investment cost parameter. The convex form accounts for the assumption that 
deploying an NGA network becomes more expensive as the rollout is extended to rural, less 
populated areas indicated by a higher R .  
In the case of investing in NGA networks in a nationwide level, R  can be seen as continuous 
in  1, maxR  implying that  = 1R  corresponds to the highest populated area and  = maxR R  
corresponds to the lowest populated area. Therefore, the whole areas within a country have 
been ranked in a decreasing order according to their population. 
 
2.2 Existing demand models 
There are many economic models that aim to estimate the demand for a good. Most of them 
base their analysis on the market structure of the industry in order to derive the demanded 
quantity. Examples of such models are those proposed by Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg, etc. 
These models are widely used in conventional markets in which there is a negative 
relationship between the demanded quantity for a good and its price. However, network 
markets, such as telecommunications, computers, electricity and railroads, present an innate 
characteristic that make them differ from conventional markets. In particular, the utility which 
a given user derives from the network good depends upon the number of other users who are 
in the same network. According to Katz and Shapiro (1985), this fact implies a positive 
consumption externality, which is widely known in the literature as network externality or 
network effect.
1
 Economides (1996) points out that this fact seems quite counterintuitive since 
it goes against the downward-sloping market demand. Thus, he proposes that a positive 
consumption externality signifies the fact that the value of a unit of the good increases with 
the expected number of units to be sold. In this case, the demand slopes downward but shifts 
upward with increases in the number of units expected to be sold. Therefore, when 
expectations are fulfilled, the derived demand curve for a network good is concave. 
Based on these observations, Shy (2011) models the demand for a network good. In particular, 
he assumes that potential subscribers can be indexed in a decreasing order according to the 
valuation (or utility) that they place on the network good. In particular, potential consumers 
are indexed by x , [0,1]x , where consumers that are indexed by low values of x  value the 
subscription highly, whereas consumers that are indexed by x  close to 1 place a low 
valuation on this service. Therefore, the variation in their willingness to pay for the network 
good forms a continuum of types of consumers. The (expected) utility of a potential 
subscriber indexed by x  is given by: 
 
e
x
(1- βx)αq - p,  if  the consumer subscribes
U =
0,  if  the consumer does not subscribe



 (2) 
 
where p  denotes the subscription fee, 
eq  the expected total number of subscribers and 
> 0β  captures the degree of consumer heterogeneity with respect to consumers’ benefit 
from this service. The parameter > 0α  measures the intensity of network effects. Higher 
values of α indicate that consumers place higher value on the ability to communicate with the 
eq subscribers, whereas α = 0  implies that there are no network effects. 
A further assumption made by Shy (2011) is that the potential consumers are distributed 
uniformly in [0,1]. The uniform distribution of the consumers implies that in each type has 
                                                 
1
 Some authors distinguish between direct and indirect network externalities. For a discussion 
on this issue see Economides (1996), Katz & Shapiro (1985), Page and Lopatka (1999) and 
Shy (2011). 
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been assigned a fixed number of potential consumers. Therefore the market demand is derived 
by multiplying the number of types whose utility is positive (i.e. buy the product or subscribe) 
with the fixed number of consumers of each type. For example, let there be N  potential 
subscribers of each type x , [0,1]x . Then, for a given subscription fee p , there is a 
consumer of type 0 1x(p)   who is indifferent between subscribing and not subscribing. 
Assuming perfect foresight, the total number of expected subscribers (or the demand for the 
network good) is = ( )
e
Nx pqu .   
However, in order to make investment costs and revenues comparable, we should transform 
the consumer type indexed by x , [0,1]x  into the range  1, maxR . This implies that each 
consumer type x  corresponds to a given geographic area R . Lower values of R  imply that 
the consumer who lives in this area place a higher valuation to the network good. For this 
purpose, the normalization method with transformation min
max min
R - R
x =
R - R
 is used. The notation 
R  stands for the original dissimilarity and x  for the normalized dissimilarity. Hence, the 
dissimilarity index R  (respectively, x ) lies between 1  and maxR  (respectively, 0 and 1). 
Applying the above normalization method yields the original dissimilarity as a function of the 
corresponding normalized dissimilarity: 
 
   max maxR = x R - 1 +1 , with R  1, R  (3) 
 
Equation 3 shows that R  is continuous in  1, maxR . In addition, = 0x  corresponds to 
= 1R  and = 1x  to maxR . This implies that the number of the potential consumers is maxNR , 
whereas the utility function of Shy (2001) becomes 
max max max
U = (R - β(x(R - 1)+1))αN(x(R - 1)+1)- px . Then, solving for x  yields the 
indifferent consumer: 
 
 
 

2
max maxU
L,H
max
αNR - 2αβN αNR  - 4αβNp
=x
2αβN R - 1
 
 
(4) 
 
 
Therefore, the expected number of potential subscribers is given by: 
 
 
 
    
    
  
2
max maxU
maxL,H
max
αNR - 2αβN αNR  - 4αβNp
= N (R - 1)+1  q
2αβN R - 1
 
 
(5) 
 
 
Since there exist two indifferent consumers between subscribing and not subscribing, there 
also exist two consumer equilibria. At every given price p , either a low or a high demand 
level would be realized according to consumers’ expectations for the demand level. If all 
consumers correctly anticipate low demand, only those who value this service highly 
( L0
U
 x x ) will subscribe. If all consumers anticipate high demand, the gain from a larger 
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anticipated network will also induce consumers with lower valuations ( L H
U U xx x ) to 
subscribe. Note that 
U
L
q  is an unstable equilibrium in the sense that a small increase in the 
number of subscribers would induce 
U
H
q  consumers to subscribe. Therefore, the demand 
(number of subscribers) for the network good is given by:  
 
 
 
2
max maxU
maxH
max
αNR - 2αβN + αNR  - 4αβNp
= N (R - 1)+1  q
2αβN R - 1
  
  
    
  
 
 
(6) 
 
 
It should be noted that, in existing markets, maxR  denotes the urban administrative divisions, 
i.e. municipal department (MD), of a country in which the consumers that place the lowest 
valuation on the new fibre-based services live. However, in the case of the NGA investments, 
this municipal department may not be covered by the investor. This implies that when a 
potential subscriber to the NGA services makes its decision to subscribe or not, s/he takes into 
account the expected number of subscribers to the NGA services rather than the whole 
population in a given country. Therefore, maxR  should be replaced by invR which denotes the 
municipal department of a country that it is covered by the investor and in which the 
consumers that place the lowest valuation on the new fibre-based services live. In other words, 
inv
R  denotes the optimal investment level chosen by an investor in NGA networks. Therefore, 
the investor maximizes the following equation with respect to invR . 
 
inv 
2
UU
H
φR
= P -q
2
 
 
 
 
 
inv
  
  
     
  
2
2
inv invU
αNR - 2αβN + αNR  - 4αβNp φR
= PN +1  -
2αβN 2
 
 
(7) 
 
 
 
 
3. The proposed approach 
This section provides a more realistic approach concerning the development of NGA 
networks. In particular, the proposed cost and demand functions depart from the existing ones 
since the proposed model captures the access networks’ underlying morphology complexity 
and the consumers’ socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
3.1 Proposed NGA investment cost  
In this case, an empirical cost analysis conducted on a nationwide NGA network provides 
insights on the cost form, so that the validity and the accuracy of the conventional cost form 
may later be explored. 
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An approach is presented in this section for getting a clear estimate of expenses for an NGA 
rollout, particularly the most future-proof access solution of FTTH deployment, as the 
investment level increases from areas with large number of households (HH) to areas with 
small number of households. Calculations are made for the main cost-drivers using real street 
network data as the basis of a fixed NGA installation combining GIS technology and Graph 
Theory techniques. 
For simplicity, the focus in this study is on the most important expenses that are the outside 
plant (OSP) capital expenditures (CAPEX). Earlier studies (Colle et al., 2008) indeed indicate 
that the major part of the total investment in a telecommunication access network is the 
capital investment made in the lower part of the network that connects a subscriber by a 
physical link to its corresponding Central Office (CO) via intermediate network components. 
Possible expenses on the active equipment or the regional/national/global backbone are not 
considered here. 
 
The architecture 
The considered FTTH architecture is presented in Figure 1. The model consists of a CO 
where all the optical line terminals are located, the feeder part of the network connecting the 
CO with flexibility points (FP), and the distribution part from FP to the end-users. The FP (or 
splitting point or cabinet) plays a concentration role, allowing the merging of customer cables. 
There are two popular technologies used with FTTH. The Point to Point (P2P) technology 
which uses all active components throughout the chain and Point to Multi-Point (P2M) / 
Passive Optical Network (PON) technology which uses passive optical splitters at the 
aggregation layer. For the purposes of this study the PON technology has been envisaged 
since it has been proven that P2P technology requires a rather costly infrastructure (Chatzi 
and Tomkos, 2011).Gigabit-capable Passive Optical Networks (GPON) are standardized by 
ITU-T under the family of recommendations G.984 (ITU-T, 2009) and are already in use in 
several countries. Here, the deployment of GPON FTTH is considered with a centralized 
1:128 splitting ratio. This means that per group of 256 customers covered by each FP, only 2 
fibres are needed for the FP-CO feeder part connection. Each CO is assumed to cover up to 
100.000 households. 
Also, a greenfield deployment is assumed and no existing infrastructure is taken into account. 
The installation closely follows one street with the cable located at the middle of the street 
and connects all households along the street. Of course, savings are possible if part of the 
network can be installed by means of aerial deployment, e.g. in areas with small number of 
households. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. FTTH access network architecture 
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The regarded elements for the calculation of the total OSP CAPEX are the trenches, the ducts, 
the fibre cables, the splitters, the manholes, and the Y-branches. The individual components’ 
costs were taken from (Chatzi and Tomkos, 2011). Any effects of changes in these prices to 
the total cost falls beyond the scope of this paper. The estimation of the volume of the 
material needed is described later on. 
The use of geometric models is very often in techno-economics for analyzing the deployment 
area and estimating the OSP cost (Casier, 2009). Typically, these geometric abstractions of 
the installation region assume a regular grid-like structure where all lines have equal length 
and the same number of junctions. However, they cannot capture the complex details of the 
underlying urban street network in order to accurately estimate the key quantities for a cost 
evaluation of a fixed access network. In fixed access networks the cables run in trenches that 
use the road system as a natural guide to reach the customers. Access network nodes as well 
as connections strongly depend on the actual geography of the underlying urban street 
network and this has been proven to have a significant impact on the key quantities for 
estimating the deployment cost (Mitcsenkov et al., 2010; Maniadakis and Varoutas, 2012). 
For this reason a recently presented methodology (Maniadakis and Varoutas, 2012) that uses 
real GIS data is extended and applied for the cost analysis. 
In this paper the 100 major MDs in Greece are selected in order to calculate and observe the 
form of the cumulative cost as the investment continues from the most populated down to the 
lowest populated MD in terms of households. The data are obtained from the collaborative 
project OpenStreetMap (OpenStreetMap, 2012) (GIS vector map) and the Hellenic Statistical 
Authority (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2001) (number of HH, number of buildings, km
2
 of 
area). The constructed dataset consists of 100 1-square-kilometer samples of street networks 
selected from the abovementioned municipal departments. Their data are imported in a GIS 
environment and are turned into spatial, weighted, undirected graphs using the Primal 
approach.  
 
 
Figure 2. In the left it is the street network of the district sample of MD Nea Smirni, while to 
the right is the corresponding Primal graph split into square serving zones with buildings 
placed equidistant and FPs placed in the optimal locations 
 
Methodology and results 
Street networks are spatial, which is a special class of complex networks whose nodes are 
embedded in a two (or three) dimensional Euclidean space and whose edges do not define 
relations in an abstract space, but are real physical connections (Cardillo et al., 2006). Such a 
street network can be represented as a graph, which consists of a finite set of nodes and a 
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finite set of edges. The graph nodes have precise position on the planar map, while the links 
follow the footprints of real streets and are associated a set of real positive numbers 
representing the street lengths. 
A sample urban area is chosen and GIS data are collected without further GIS processing or 
analysis. The GIS data are then transformed to a spatial, weighted, undirected graph using the 
Primal approach (Porta et al., 2006) where intersections are turned into nodes and streets into 
edges, as shown in Figure 2. Depending on the number of buildings in the area, a new spatial 
network is made as an extension of the street network, with new nodes placed equidistance 
from neighbor nodes (inter building spacing - IBS) along the existing edges, so that the total 
number of nodes is equal to the number of buildings. In addition, depending on the number of 
HH in the area, a number of FPs is assigned at optimal locations applying the Closeness 
Centrality method. Each FP can serve a maximum number of households, e.g. 256, thus the 
total number of households is divided to this number to produce the required FPs. Then, the 
considered area needs to be split into serving zones, for example squares of equal size in order 
to serve approximately the same number of buildings/households. Each FP is associated with 
a serving zone such that the inscribed subnetwork that gathers all fibre lines between the FP 
and the subscribers displays a star structure that follows the underlying street network. The 
network can retain information in the edge weights, such as the trenching length, the size of 
the duct, the fibre length, etc. Then, the volume of the various network components may be 
computed with simple calculations on the graph weights, as described in (Maniadakis and 
Varoutas, 2012). 
The cost is calculated for each 1-square-kilometer sample and then a cost/HH can be derived 
if the cost is divided with the number of HH in the sample, as shown in Figure 3 for the case 
of Greece. All costs are estimated for a project horizon of 20 years. The cost/HH per year is 
estimated to vary from 2,25€ to 265€. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cost per HH per year for the major MDs (sorted in number of HH) of Greece 
 
The present study focuses on the 100 most populated MDs in terms of HH that vary from 
301.566 HH to 5.953 HH and HH density that varies from 9.464 HH/km
2
 to 24 HH/km
2
. 
However, the vast majority of these MDs belongs to the high-dense HH MDs, as 67 out of 
100 belong to the top-100 most densely populated MDs in HH. Thus, this means that either 
the investment grows from largest to lowest MD in terms of number of HH as described here, 
or from largest to lowest MD in terms of HH density, the cost results are similarly distributed. 
In total, the 100 MDs under investigation cover 2.089.992 HH or 57% of all HH in Greece. 
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Multiplying the above estimated cost per HH with the corresponding MD ’s number of HH 
gives the cost per MD. Its cumulative distribution is depicted in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. The cumulative cost per year for the major MDs (sorted in number of HH) of 
Greece 
 
It is now convenient to derive the cost function that describes NGA investment as the 
investment level moves on greater level, covering less populated areas. Using regression 
analysis on the real cost data, the derived NGA investment cost function is given by: 
 
invinv invC( )= 920,03 +174197
2R RR  (8) 
 
3.2 Proposed NGA demand  
Although the uniformity assumption is convenient for deriving analytical results, it has been 
fiercely criticized in the literature. The reason is that uniform consumer distribution may not 
be highly satisfactory in representing actual consumer distributions in many markets (Ansari, 
Economides and Ghosh, 1994) and hence it is more realistic to assume non-uniform consumer 
distributions (Anderson, Goeree and Ramer, 1997).  
Indeed, in many network markets, such as telecommunications, the valuation that the 
consumers place to the network good is significantly affected by their location (i.e. the 
population-affected type of the area they live in). The related literature studies the 
determinants of broadband availability, adoption and usage depending on location. For 
example, Flamm and Chaudhuri (2007) find a positive urban and suburban role in stimulating 
both dialup and broadband adoption. They attribute this result to social characteristics that 
make the Internet and broadband use more attractive to urban and suburb dwellers than to 
rural folk. A more conclusive study that includes the main results of the related literature is 
Preston, Cawley and Metykova (2007) which analyze the status of broadband in rural areas in 
the EU. They look at availability, adoption and use of broadband, taking a policy perspective 
drawing from the results of the BEACON research, which provides an analysis of the 
broadband situation in each of the 25 EU countries. Their main findings are: a geographic 
broadband divide; lower investment in infrastructure in rural areas; where broadband is 
available, lack of competition in infrastructure and services; the fact that the rural broadband 
divides go along with other traditional divides; the fact that rural areas suffer from declining 
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and aging population; the fact that the rural dwellers tend to be slower adopters; the fact that 
the rural areas have less technical support; the circumstance that social factors that facilitate 
broadband use (such as education, profession, economic status and cultural practice) can be 
less favourable in rural communities. The main take-away of the above studies is that 
consumers who place a higher (lower) valuation to broadband subscription tend to live in 
higher (lower) populated areas. 
This conclusion signifies the fact that uniform consumer distribution fails in representing the 
actual demand in telecommunications markets in which the consumers’ valuation for the good 
varies according to the population of the location (area) they live in. Thus, the aim of this 
section is to estimate the demand for the new fibre-based services when the relationship 
between location and valuation for the good is taken into account. This implies that the 
distribution of the consumers to their different types is not uniform but follows a certain non-
uniform distribution that captures the fact that consumers who place a higher (lower) 
valuation to the network good tend to live in areas with higher (lower) population.  
A particular type of non-uniform distribution in literature that can describe the population 
allocation in urban divisions is the power law or Pareto distribution (Soo, 2005). This 
distribution, when plotted on double logarithmic axes, shows a remarkable linear pattern 
where the slope of the line is usually close to -1, corresponding to the well-known Zipf’s law 
distribution (Zipf, 1949). This type of non-uniform distribution is quite appropriate to chose 
since it states that a size is inversely proportional to its rank in a sorted order. For example, in 
the case of populations, the population size of each city in a country appears to be inversely 
proportional to the city rank. Therefore, the variation in the population of each area forms a 
continuum of areas. This fact is in full accordance with the model proposed by Shy (2011) 
and hence they can be easily compared. 
In Figure 5 there are presented the most populated municipal departments of Greece in terms 
of households. Specifically, there are included MDs until 100 HH (3679 MDs in total). Their 
HH-Rank distribution fits a power law (R
2
>0,99) with a power law exponent near -1, 
indicating a Zipf distribution. 
 
 
Figure 5. HH distribution is a Zipf distribution; the case of Greece (2001) 
 
 13 
As mentioned by Kyriakidou, Michalakelis and Varoutas (2011), Zipf’s law can be described 
by the following equation: 
 
Constant C
Rank x Population = Constant Population =   pop(R)=
Rank R
   (9) 
 
Let rank the MDs according to their HH number in a decreasing order. Then, 
min
R = 1  
denotes the area with the highest population and 
max
R = R  denotes the area with the lowest 
population. Figure 6 plots the non-uniform distribution of consumers according to their 
willingness to pay.  
 
Po
p
u
la
ti
o
n
Rank max
R10
Potential consumers
under non-uniform 
distribution
 
Figure 6. Non-uniform distribution of consumers according to their willingness to pay 
 
Figure 6 reflects the fact that consumers with high willingness to pay live in areas with high 
population. However, the distribution of consumers according to their willingness to pay (or 
equivalently the rank of the areas they live in) is not uniform, but follows the Zipf’s law. 
Therefore, the maximum number of potential consumers is represented by the shaded region 
of the above figure, which is given by:  
 
   
max max
max
R R Rmax
max1
1 1
C
= pop R dR = dR =   C ln R  = Cln Rq
R

    n u  (10) 
 
Similar to Shy (2011), only those types of consumers whose valuation for the network good is 
positive buy the good or subscribe. Therefore, for a given subscription fee p , there is a 
consumer of type  0    1 x p  who is indifferent between subscribing and not subscribing. 
This indifferent consumer is affected by the expected total number of subscribers which is 
given by: 
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 
max max
max
x(R -1)+1 x(R -1)+1
x(R -1)+1e
n-u 1
1 1
C
= pop R dR = dR = C ln R  q
R
       
 e maxn-u = Cln x(R - 1)+1q  (11) 
 
Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq. (2) and using Eq. (3) gives the (expected) utility of a potential 
subscriber indexed by [0,1]x  when the distribution of consumers according to their 
willingness to pay follows the Zipf’s law: 
 
max max max(R - β(x(R - 1)+1))αCln(x(R - 1)+1) - p,  if  the consumer subscribes
V =x
0,  if  the consumer does not subscribe



 
 
(12) 
 
 
Solving Eq. (12) with respect to x  yields the indifferent consumer: 
 
 
 
max
V
L,H
max
αCR - αβC .  
=x
2αβC R - 1
 
 
(13) 
 
 
where 
 
     
2 2 2 2
max max
. = αβC + αCR  - 2α βC R - 4pαβC  
 
(14) 
 
Then, by substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (11), the expected number of potential subscribers is 
derived: 
 
   
  
 
max
V
L,H
αCR - αβC .  
= Cln +1q
2αβC
   (15) 
 
Once again, it is proven that 
V
L
q  is an unstable equilibrium in the sense that a small increase 
in the number of subscribers would induce 
V
H
q  consumers to subscribe. Therefore, the 
demand (number of subscribers) for the network good is given by:  
 
   
  
 
max
V
H
αCR - αβC + .  
= Cln +1q
2αβC
 
 
(16) 
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which is represented by the shaded region in Figure 7.  
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Hx  max( 1) 1
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Expected subscribers
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Figure 7.  Demand with non-uniform consumer distribution 
 
As in the case of the existing approach, maxR  should be replaced by invR  in order to capture 
the fact that a potential subscriber to the NGA services makes its decision to subscribe or not 
based on the expected number of subscribers to the NGA services rather than the whole 
population in a given country. Therefore, the investor maximizes the following equation with 
respect to invR . 
 
inv 
VV 2
invH
= P - 920,03 +174197Rq R  
 
 
 
 
( )inv
 
 

  
 
invV 2
inv
αCR - αβC + .  
= PCln +1  - 920,03 +174197RR
2αβC
 
 
(17) 
 
where 
 
     
2 2 2 2
inv inv
. = αβC + αCR  - 2α βC R - 4pαβC  
 
(18) 
 
 
4. Comparison of the two approaches 
This section compares the outcomes of the two approaches in terms of the optimal investment 
level ( inv
i
R ) and the subsequent levels of subscribers (
i
H
q ), investment costs ( inv
i
C ), revenues 
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( iR ) and profits (
i
Π ), where the superscript i =U,V  stand for the existing and the 
proposed approach, respectively. The main part of the analysis that follows is conducted via 
numerical simulations due to the complexity of closed-form solutions for the endogenous 
variable 
inv
R  in Eqs. (7) and (17). The optimal investment levels for the investor under both 
approaches are derived for 9 different scenarios concerning different values of the 
independent parameters β  and φ . These parameters are chosen because the sensitivity 
analysis conducted showed that β  and φ  have the more powerful impact on total profits. In 
order to define the other independent parameters actual data from Greece are used. In 
particular, C = 400000  denotes the most populated municipal department in Greece (see 
Figure 5) and P = 480  denotes the annual average price per household. In addition, the level 
of α  is chosen arbitrarily to 1 since sensitivity analysis shows that α  does not significantly 
affect the final results.  
A very significant observation is that the total number of HH is the same either if they are 
uniformly or non-uniformly distributed to the different municipal departments. In the former 
case the total number of HH is maxNR , whereas in the latter case the total number of HH is 
 maxCln R . Equating the two populations and solving with respect to N  gives the fixed 
number of HH assigned by Shy (2001) to each municipal department: 
 
 max
max
ln R
N = C
R
 (19) 
 
In the case of Greece, 6122maxR  since there are 6122 municipal departments. Therefore, 
Shy (2001) assigns 570 HH to every of 6122 municipal departments. The final results can be 
summarized in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
Table 1 
  inv
U
R  inv
V
R  
U
Hx  
V
Hx  
U
H
q  
V
H
q  
β = 1,00  φ= 5.000  54,70 279,14 0,99 0,99 31.160 2.252.684 
β = 1,00  φ= 10.000  27,37 279,14 0,99 0,99 15.580 2.252.684 
β = 1,00  φ= 15.000  18,27 279,14 0,99 0,99 10.387 2.252.684 
β = 1,45  φ= 5.000  37,75 279,14 0,68 0,68 14.821 2.252.684 
β = 1,45  φ= 10.000  18,92 279,14 0,67 0,68 7.140 2.252.684 
β = 1,45  φ= 15.000  12,67 279,14 0,66 0,68 4.940 2.252.684 
β = 1,90  φ= 5.000  28,84 279,14 0,51 0,52 8.632 2.252.684 
β = 1,90  φ= 10.000  14,50 279,14 0,49 0,52 4.316 2.252.684 
β = 1,90  φ= 15.000  9,76 279,14 0,46 0,52 2.878 2.252.684 
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Table 2 
  inv
U
C  inv
V
C  
U
R  
V
R  
U
Π  
V
Π  
β = 1,00
 
φ= 5.000
 
7.482.6
94 
120.312.5
85 
14.956.9
61 
1.081.288.
267 
7.474.2
67 
960.975.6
82 
β = 1,00
 
φ= 10.000
 
3.747.6
79 
120.312.5
85 
7.478.48
9 
1.081.288.
267 
3.730.8
10 
960.975.6
82 
β = 1,00
 
φ= 15.000
 
2.505.5
12 
120.312.5
85 
4.985.68
5 
1.081.288.
267 
2.480.1
73 
960.975.6
82 
β = 1,45
 
φ= 5.000
 
3.563.0
62 
120.312.5
85 
7.113.89
8 
1.009.948.
067 
3.550.8
36 
889.635.4
82 
β = 1,45
 
φ= 10.000
 
1.790.7
53 
120.312.5
85 
3.556.98
8 
1.009.948.
067 
1.766.2
35 
889.635.4
82 
β = 1,45
 
φ= 15.000
 
1.204.1
86 
120.312.5
85 
2.371.43
9 
1.009.948.
067 
1.167.2
53 
889.635.4
82 
β = 1,90
 
φ= 5.000
 
2.079.6
28 
120.312.5
85 
4.143.21
8 
958.052.32
3 
2.063.5
90 
837.739.7
38 
β = 1,90
 
φ= 10.000
 
1.051.9
94 
120.312.5
85 
2.071.72
5 
958.052.32
3 
1.019.7
31 
837.739.7
38 
β = 1,90
 
φ= 15.000
 
715.171 
120.312.5
85 
1.381.48
4 
958.052.32
3 
666.313 
837.739.7
38 
 
The values of β  are chosen in order to ensure that 0 1x(p)  , whereas  the values of φ  
represent three different scenarios concerning the relationship between the investment cost 
function given by Eq. (1) and the real-cost-data-based investment cost function given by Eq. 
(8). Figure 8 shows that regardless of the particular value of φ , Eq. (1) always underestimates 
the investment cost of the higher populated MDs and overestimates the investment cost of the 
lower populated MDs. In particular, the lower the value of φ , the more underestimated 
(overestimated) the investment cost of the higher (lower)  populated MD becomes. This 
implies that the lower the value of φ , the lower populated is the MD that the cost functions of 
Eqs. 1 and 8 result to the same deployment cost. 
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Figure 8.  Cumulative investment cost per year 
 
A number of observations derived by the analysis of Table 1 and 2 are instructive. An 
increase in φ  and/or β  leads inv
U
R  to decrease, whereas inv
V
R  is not affected by a change in 
φ  and/or β . The comparison between inv
U
R  and inv
V
R  shows that inv
V
R  is always much 
greater than inv
U
R . Since the indifferent subscriber is almost the same in both approaches, it is 
reasonable that the number of subscribers is higher under the proposed than the existing 
approach. This, in turn, results in higher revenues under the proposed than the existing 
approach since it is assumed that the price of the service is the same under both approaches. 
Concerning the deployment cost, it is shown that an increase in φ  and/or β  leads inv
U
C  to 
decrease, whereas inv
V
C  is not affected by a change in φ  and/or β . The comparison between 
inv
U
C  and inv
V
C  shows that inv
V
C  is always much greater than inv
U
C .  
Another very significant finding is that an increase in β  negatively affects the investor’s 
profits under both approaches. However, the investor’s profits under the proposed approach 
are much greater than the investor’s profits under the existing approach. The main reason for 
this result is that the uniformity assumption underestimates the number of households in the 
most populated areas where the cost per household is lower. This partially interprets the 
investor’s decision to limit its investment level under the existing approach. This, in turn, 
decreases the expected number of subscribers, which also decreases the actual number of 
subscribers.  
Therefore, the departure from the uniformity assumption allows capturing the fact that 
subscribers who place a higher valuation to broadband subscription tend to live in higher 
populated areas where the cost per household is lower. It is thus obvious why the proposed 
approach leads to much higher investment level than the existing approach. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was twofold; firstly to investigate whether the traditional quadratic 
convex cost form is suitable for being used in NGA investments; and secondly to propose a 
more realistic demand model. Thus, (i) an empirical cost analysis was conducted for a real case 
of NGA deployment and a real-data-based cost function was obtained; and (ii) the Pareto 
consumer distribution was used to reflect the greater (lower) positive impact of NGA 
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investments on the willingness to pay of the consumers who live in more (less) populated 
areas. 
In the case of the investment cost, the existing assumption of the quadratic convex cost form 
was found inaccurate when compared with the cost estimation conducted for the 100 major 
municipal departments in terms of HH in Greece. The methodology used for the cost 
estimation took into account the underlying street morphology complexity that the classic 
approaches ignore due to the use of the simple geometric models. In particular, the cost 
function used in the existing models always underestimates the investment cost of the higher 
populated areas and overestimates the investment cost of the lower populated areas. 
Concerning the demand for the new fibre-based services, it was found that the existing 
demand models with network externalities always underestimate such demand since they 
assume uniform consumer distribution. The reason is that the uniformity assumption 
underestimates the number of households in the most populated areas where the cost per 
household is lower. Therefore, the optimal investment level from an investor’s perspective is 
always much higher under the proposed approach than the traditional one. 
Although this article provided some very useful results, there are many directions to be 
extended in order to overcome its limitations. First, the derived cost structure is based on 
actual cost data from Greece and hence its robustness should be investigated by using cost 
data from other countries. Second, this article neglects the impact of competition on the retail 
price, as well as, regulatory issues concerning the access price that an access seeker should 
pay to the investor in order to have access to the new fibre-based infrastructure. 
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